

Pakistan During 2010

Challenges Faced by the State and Society

February 2, 2011

Year 2010 has been yet another challenging year in the series since Pakistan joined the war on terror an ally to the US and NATO. Surrounded by challenges on its Eastern and Western borders, the Pakistani State and Society found them in a whirlwind of national and international issues pertaining to democracy at home and peace and security in region and the world. In this report, the Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad, has reviewed the situation vis-à-vis the three most crucial issues facing the Pakistani State and the Society i.e. Extremism, Democracy at Home and the Handling of the Devastating Floods, and Pakistan's Foreign Relations.

1. EXTREMISM, TERRORISM AND MILITANCY:

According to a study conducted by Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), terrorist activities¹ had declined in 2010 – a decrease by 21% compared to 2009. Furthermore, there was a decrease in suicide bombings – a total of 68 in 2010 compared to 87 in 2009.²

Ethno-linguistic tensions, however, re-emerged, not least in Karachi where the forces representing leading identities in the city, namely Urdu-speakers and Pashtuns, engaged in verbal and even physical clashes. Overall, 1,981 people were killed in Karachi during the past year with 361 falling victim to target killing.³ Further, several high-profile terrorists (mentioned below) were arrested from Karachi.

While convergence of the militants with ethnic groups was openly debated in Karachi, it can be also be read in the power relations between ethnic identities in different parts of the country: not a single terrorist act⁴ is recorded in Qilla Saifullah, a Pashtun-majority area in Balochistan, and Hazara belt (Abbottabad/Haripur), a Hindko-speaking area in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which even underwent tensions over changing the province's name (*see also* domestic politics).

Sectarianism, targeting public⁵ places, was visibly another trend in the attacks in 2010. Notably, on May 28, a Friday congregation prayer of Ahmedis was attacked in Lahore; similarly, shrines of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi (October 7)⁶ and Baba Farid in Pakpattan (October 25)⁷, Data Darbar in Lahore on the night of July 1⁸ and the Bareilvis-led *Milad-ul-Nab*⁹ processions in DI Khan and Faisalabad¹⁰ were attacked. Moreover, on October 2, Dr. Farooq, a leading Islamic scholar, was also killed in his hometown of Mardan.¹¹

¹ These include all kind of terrorist activities such as ethno-political, sectarian, and the insurgency-related.

² A summary can be download at the PIPS website: www.san-pips.com

³ Roy Jawad Hussain, "748 target-killed in Karachi last year: HRCP," Pakistan Criminal Records, January 6, 2011, <http://pakistancriminalrecords.com/2011/01/06/748-target-killed-in-karachi-last-year-hrcp/>

⁴ Based on the study of PIPS, which has identified such areas as "white zones."

⁵ By public, the reference is towards notable.

⁶ Amjad Bashir Siddiqi and Zia Ur Rehman, "Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine targeted, 10 killed," Central Asia Online, http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/caii/newsbriefs/2010/10/07/newsbrief-00

⁷ "Blast at Baba Farid's shrine kills six", The Express Tribune, October 26, 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/67328/baba-farid-shrine-blast-4-dead/>

⁸ News report, "Deadly blasts hit Sufi shrine in Lahore", BBC News, July 2, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10483453>

⁹ A memorial to honor Holy Prophet (PBUH)

¹⁰ Second editorial, "Religious intolerance," *Daily Times*, March 02, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\03\02\story_2-3-2010_pg3_1

¹¹ Fazal Khaliq and Manzoor Ali, "Noted religious scholar shot dead in Mardan," *The Express Tribune*, October 3, 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/57604/educationist-killed-in-mardan/>

Radicalization among Pakistani migrants also raised alarms when United States escaped a major attack when Faisal Shehzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen, left an explosive-laden truck for detonation at Times Square on May 1, 2010.¹²

The bomb, if exploded, would have been the first instance¹³ of Pakistani Taliban making inroads in the United States. Faisal Shehzad's case and the subsequent shift in responsibilities¹⁴ in the public domain by U.S. and Pakistan towards each other, show how ten years down the war on terrorism, the state-centric lens toward trans-national threats remained an attire of both the states.

Nowhere was such an approach clearer than in the actions and words surrounding the U.S.'s "surgical strikes" in Pakistan. On September 27, 2010, NATO helicopters, while chasing the insurgents, made into Pakistan's airspace in Kurram Agency and the subsequent firing resulted in the loss of three personnel of Frontier Constabulary, a paramilitary organization in the tribal areas of Pakistan¹⁵. In response, Pakistan blocked the supply line and registered formal protest.¹⁶ (The line was resumed on October 10¹⁷ after Ambassador Ann W. Patterson offered a public apology on Oct. 7, 2010¹⁸)

Despite challenges, there have been instances of better intelligence coordination: in the first and latter half of 2010, key al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders were arrested from Karachi, which included a key aide of Zawahiri (Umar Misri),¹⁹ a close associate of Baitullah Mehsud (Alam

¹² William K. Rashbaum, Mark Mazzetti, and Peter Baker (May 4, 2010). "Arrests in Pakistan Widen Bombing Case". *New York Times*, May 5, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/nyregion/05bomb.html?_r=1&hp

¹³ Although Baitullah Mehsud, claimed to have hired assassins in 2009, U.S. officials dismiss TTP's links in the shootout.

¹⁴ Pakistan said that being a naturalized citizen, it was U.S.'s responsibility; U.S., on the other hand, revealed that he was offered training in North Waziristan.

¹⁵ Jane Perlez and Helene Cooper, "Signaling Tensions, Pakistan Shuts NATO Route," *New York Times*, September 30, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/world/asia/01peshawar.html>

¹⁶ Jane Perlez and Helene Cooper, "Signaling Tensions, Pakistan Shuts NATO Route," *New York Times*, September 30, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/world/asia/01peshawar.html>

¹⁷ Lehas Ali, "NATO supplies through Pakistan border resume," Oct. 10, 2010, *AFP*, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hKWRcs18EnI14xcdNehD1hEM2SA?docId=CNG.159465f3db6b6affe62ddd979b18cf3.221>

¹⁸ Kamran Yousaf, "Sorry...", *The Express Tribune*, October 7, 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/59310/us-apologises-over-nato-incursions/>

¹⁹ Ali K Chishti, "Two top Qaeda operatives arrested from Karachi," *Daily Times*, December 21, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\12\21\story_21-12-2010_pg7_3

Mehsud)²⁰, son-in-law of Mullah Omar (Aga Mutasim)²¹, and second-in-line to Mullah Omar (Mullah Baradar)²².

Drone attacks, coupled with Pakistan's military operations on the ground, challenged the presence of the militants on ground. For the first month of 2010, there were even speculations that Hakeemullah Mehsud²³, TTP's leader, has also been dead in a drone strike, much like Baitullah Mehsud was killed in late 2009. By the end of the year, the drone attacks were further expanded in Khyber Agency resulting into collateral damage.²⁴

Pakistan's military continued its operation, named "Rah-i-Nijat," in the lower parts of the Orakzai agency, which was ended with Chief of Army Staff's visit in June 2010,²⁵ and also conducted operations in some parts of Frontier Region Peshawar as well as provided helicopter service for Kurram.²⁶ That the militants' would escape to North Waziristan triggered a debate over the prospects of any operation there; however, obstacles behind the immediate action in North Waziristan are said to be pertaining to the operational commitments of the military in other areas, thereby affecting the availability of funds and logistics required for the operation, the terrain and weather of the area,²⁷ and the strategic factor for Pakistan behind the operation²⁸.

In terms of counter-insurgency doctrine, Pakistan came a long way – in comparison to 2008. As an example, before 2009, Pakistan had little success; only after 2009, Pakistan was able to achieve success when it was able to secure both Bajaur and Swat. In 2010, Pakistan army even

²⁰ "Pakistan nabs aide to Taliban chief Mehsud", *UPI.com*, March. 5, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/03/05/Pakistan-nabs-aide-to-Taliban-chief-Mehsud/UPI-68131267808587/

²¹ Faraz Khan, "Mullah Omar's son-in-law held from Karachi", *Daily Times*, March 5, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\03\05\story_5-3-2010_pg1_1

²² Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, "Secret Joint Raid Captures Taliban's Top Commander", *New York Times*, February 15, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/world/asia/16intel.html>

²³ "Credible reports show Hakeemullah Mehsud is dead, says Malik", *Daily Times*, February 11, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\02\11\story_11-2-2010_pg1_7

²⁴ "Scores die as drones renew attack on Pakistan's Khyber", *BBC World*, 17 December 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12015959>

²⁵ "Army claims victory in Orakzai operation," *The Express Tribune*, June 2, 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/18078/army-claims-victory-in-orakzai-operation/>

²⁶ "Helicopter service starts for Kurram Agency," *The News*, January 18, 2011, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=9611>

²⁷ The setting of winter season in North Waziristan is set to have postponed the operation.

²⁸ Pakistan's support to the Haqqani network is often cited as a reason against sending troops to the area.

declared Bajaur as conflict-free zone²⁹ while it also announced the withdrawal of troops from Swat³⁰.

That the operation consisted of conducting aerial bombing first and later, sending boots on the grounds along with help from the air shows Pakistan's reliance on the air power. Similarly, the displacement of non-combatants also marked Pakistan's strategy of dealing with the combatants. In fact, a way of judging the next spot of attack has been after knowing the migration pattern. In 2010 people of the Lower Orakzai migrated – since the operation was kept at low-profile. Moreover, while a military solution is being rendered by “clearing” the area in the counter-insurgency operation, the larger solution that “holds” the area is still missing. This could aggravate the problem as militants may re-enter.³¹

2. DOMESTIC POLITICS:

1. Legislative Measures:

The most significant move was the recommendations put forward by the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms (PCCR) to be passed through the national assembly in the form of the 18th Amendment on April 8, 2010; the amendment was aimed at addressing provincial disparities and restoring the constitution to its parliamentary character.

Later, in December 2010, parliament also passed the 19th Amendment which was intended to address the appointment of judges to the higher courts by avoiding any executive-judiciary clash. The issue surfaced in the wake of the criticism hurled at the 18th amendment over the appointment of judges.

Earlier, in March 2010, the President also signed a bill which was aimed at addressing sexual harassment at workplace – the bill was tabled in the parliament last year.

Another bill, “Anti-Terrorism Bill,” was also tabled in July, 2010. The bill, tabled by Interior Minister Rehman Malik in the Senate, puts forward several suggestions such as in-camera trial of the terrorists, trial of individuals running illegal FM radio stations, remand of the arrested terrorists for 90 days etc.³²

²⁹ Zulfiqar Ali, "Bajaur declared conflict-free zone", Dawn, April 20, 2010,

<http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/national/bajaur-declared-conflictfree-zone-040>

³⁰ Fazal Khaliq, "Army withdrawing some troops after restoring peace in Swat," The Express Tribune, November 24, 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/81002/swat-valley-army-withdrawing-some-troops-after-restoring-peace/>

³¹ Tayyab Ali Shah, "Pakistan's Bajaur Agency Emerges as New Hub for Islamist Militancy", Global Terrorism Analysis, August 12, 2010,

[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=36739&cHash=de992b83e4](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36739&cHash=de992b83e4)

³² "Anti-Terrorism Bill tabled in Senate," *The Express Tribune*, July 27, 2010,

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/31554/anti-terrorism-bill-tabled-in-senate/>

However, the old issues of the nature of state re-emerged in the midst of the legislative measures. After the bill on the sexual harassment was passed by the parliament, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) expressed its reservations over what it saw as having clauses clashing with the injunctions of Islam. The role of CII would emerge later in the year when the debate over the revising of blasphemy laws kicked off in the country. After Punjab Governor Salman Taseer was assassinated, in the first week of 2011, for his stance on the blasphemy law, it was later reported that the CII had earlier recommended that the cases pertaining to blasphemy laws be heard in the Federal Shariat Court.³³

Provincial harmony - in order to address long-standing grievances of the smaller provinces, several steps, both symbolic and statistical, were taken during 2010.

The 18th amendment passed by the parliament of Pakistan formally changed the name of the North-West Frontier Province into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Renaming the province has been one of the oldest demands of the Pashtun nationalist forces in the province to secure an identity for the Pashtun, the majority ethnic group in the province. Given the presence of Pashtun nationalist party, Awami National Party (ANP), in the federal coalition, the name change was suggested in the committee and approved.

The name change demand was long ignored by the state, owing to the irredentist association³⁴ of the name as well as the fear that smaller ethnic groups in the province may resist majoritarian coinage. Thus, as the deliberations of the name change were being worked on, political and social groups in the Hazara region, which lies in the north of the province, rejected name change as they found the Hazara identity being swept away in the name – the end name “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” was thought to be based on consensus.

The 18th amendment also ensured asked for the abolishment of the concurrent list through a process of transferring forty (40) areas to the provinces. The process involves a total of eighteen (18) provinces to be transferred to the provinces by June 2011.³⁵ So far, five (5) have been done³⁶; these are: Special Initiatives, Zakat and Ushr, Population Welfare, Youth Affairs and Local Government and Rural Development.

Earlier, on the eve of the last year of 2009, the entire federating units, that is the center and provinces, signed the 7th National Finance Commission Award. The award, aimed at deciding the division of resources among the provinces, was hailed for being a

³³ Qaiser Butt, Top Islamic advisory body: CII proposed death on blasphemy law misuse," *The Express Tribune*, January 13, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/103119/top-islamic-advisory-body-cii-proposed-death-on-blasphemy-law-misuse/>

³⁴ This irredentist claim surrounded on the pan-Pashtun nationalist state, *Pashtunistan*, comprising of Pakistani and Afghanistani Pahstuns.

³⁵ Ijaz Kakakhel, "Devolution process to complete by June 30th, NA told," *Daily Times*, January 28, 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\01\28\story_28-1-2011_pg7_3

³⁶ News report, "Five ministries shifted to provinces under 18th amendment: Rabbani", *South Asia News Agency*, <http://www.sananews.net/english/2011/01/29/five-ministries-shifted-to-provinces-under-18th-amendment-rabbani/>

“consensus” award passed after a long time: 19 years. The 7th Award itself put forward multiple options along horizontal resource distribution such as past neglect and experience as a conflict zone through war on terror, so as to address the plight of Balochistan and NWFP (later renamed as KP) instead of only deciding on the basis of population which favored Punjab province.

Challenge, nonetheless, came from the implementation phase.

Take the Balochistan issue: as a comparison, in 2009, the government passed the “Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan” (Initiation for the Rights of Balochistan) package which aimed at redressing their long grievances from the center. Yet, no significant breakthrough was achieved in bringing the center and province on harmony rather the killing of nationalists further irked those in parliament. In fact, the package itself was not accepted by the major players from within the Balochistan’s nationalist cadre.

Likewise, even though Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani, in his maiden speech as prime minister in the parliament in 2008, announced of abrogating Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) in Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the ground situation is that the status of the area hasn’t changed.

In another turn of event, the largest province of Punjab has started complaining to the center for less supply of resources, that obstructs its economic growth. In 2010, two cases reflect it: One, Sindh was at discord with Punjab over the flow and distribution of water³⁷; Punjab being upper-riparian takes most the share – something disliked by other provinces. Two, the Chief Minister of Punjab has repeatedly expressed its dislike over the closure of gas supply to Punjab, as the gas shortage in the winter 2010 led to shutting down of industrial units, job cuts and economic stagnation; in 2011, Punjab vowed to bring the issue on CCI³⁸.

Finally, the transfer of ministries from the center to the provinces has witness resistance as well as criticism from the people associated with the ministries. It is argued that the provinces may not be have the required capacity to run some of the areas, or that transferring ministries like education³⁹ or departments like Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation, under tourism⁴⁰, will result into lack of guidance of the relevant area or parallel development of the area – this is specifically mentioned of education.

³⁷ News report, “Provinces fail to resolve row,” *The Express Tribune*, October 1, 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/56969/provinces-fail-to-resolve-row/>

³⁸ News report, “Council of Common Interests: Body to discuss Punjab’s gas shortage”, *The Express Tribune*, January 29, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/110843/council-of-common-interests-body-to-discuss-punjab-gas-shortage/>

³⁹ Peer Muhammad, "18th Amendment: Education ministry’s plea to stop its devolution denied," *The Express Tribune*, January 25, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/108718/18th-amendment-education-ministrys-plea-to-stop-its-devolution-denied/>

⁴⁰ Zeeshan Javaid, "Senate body on culture and tourism," *Daily Times*, January 23, 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\01\23\story_23-1-2011_pg7_11

Parliamentary democracy – although Pakistan’s constitutions enshrined it to be a parliamentary democracy, successive military rules and powerful president have rendered the purity of parliamentary democracy questionable. 2010 is marked with several steps which tilted the balance of power in favor of parliament and prime minister.

One, the power of the President to dissolve the assembly, through the article 58-2(b), was revoked⁴¹; this article, passed in 1980s, empowered the President to dismiss the elected parliament and prime minister if and when he deems fit. The article was subject to criticism for not only were prime ministers in the past sent home, but it kept the prime minister cautious of the interests of the president. The 18th amendment passed by the parliament abolished the article, thereby retaining the symbolic status of the President, as is supposed to be in a parliamentary democracy.

Likewise, the 18th amendment also suggested the constitution of Council of Common Interest under prime minister. Council of Common Interest, abbreviated as CII, is mandated with resolving pending issues among the province⁴² – one of the issues that kept popping up in 2010 was the distribution of resources during several crisis such as energy (which continues to this day) and funds allocation during the floods (see below).

Although steps like the one mentioned above are meant to reflect Pakistan’s parliamentary constitution, the presence of informal power distribution cannot be denied. The most blatant case in the limits in power which are not only felt internally but also exercised on the grounds was reflected by the revelations surfaced through the WikiLeaks in 2010 – even though the era it mentioned was prior to 2010. This includes: the power enjoyed through the chairpersonship of a political party, presently in power in a certain administrative unit as in the case of Asif Zardari⁴³, Nawaz Sharif⁴⁴, and Asfandiyar Wali⁴⁵; the power relation between Chief of Army Staff and rest of the players of the troika namely president and prime minister; the power of the assessment of institutes like Council of Islamic Ideology versus legislation passed by the parliament.

2. Flood Management:

The last year, 2010, witnessed one of the worst floods in the history of Pakistan; rising from the storms in the northwest Pakistan, the floods made their way into the Kabul and the Indus, thereby affecting the areas that adjoin them. More than 20 million people were displaced while one-fifth of the country was affected.

⁴¹ Tanveer Ahmed, “‘Consensus on 18th Amendment better for economy’, *Daily Times*, April 3, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\04\03\story_3-4-2010_pg5_3

⁴² “Pakistani liberals’ stance on Federalism,” Freedom Gate Pakistan, http://www.freedomgatepakistan.org/freedom.php?page_id=2

⁴³ His party portfolio: Co-Chairperson of Pakistan Peoples Party, ruling party in the Center.

⁴⁴ His party portfolio: Quaid (Leader) of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, ruling party in Punjab province.

⁴⁵ His party portfolio: Chairperson of Awami National Party, ruling party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

The state's inability to cope with the disaster has been subject to criticism. First and foremost was the absence of warnings about the floods. The floods, however, were unexpected in the common knowledge because, unlike the past when monsoon clouds would drop over Punjab, the rain happened in the northwest⁴⁶. Additional fact that natural barriers like woods were absent increased the severity of the floods.

Given the federal setup, with the provinces being administered by different political groups, reservations over distribution of resources surfaced soon. Even if organization like National Disaster Management Agency was responsible for distribution, there was no oversight mechanism – something which was later filled in by the formation of NODMC (National Oversight Disaster Management Council). A 15-member forum, NODMC is responsible for interact with “authorities relevant to reconstruction”⁴⁷ such as NDMA, provincial governments, Economic Affairs Division, and Planning Commission.

Aid flew in from abroad though it was generally agreed that given lack of transparency and aid fatigue, the total amount was less than what was expected in a disaster of such a scale. According to Oxfam, the total contribution per affected person has been \$3.2, as compared to \$495 in Haiti and even \$70 in Kashmir earthquake.⁴⁸ So far, as per official records, half of the funding has been received – that is \$975 million of the \$1.94 billion requested.⁴⁹

Although the government has rescued millions of people, and is considering end of emergency relief operation by the end of January 2011, much needs to be done such as accelerating the response of the donors, which has been sluggish, in the reconstruction phase.

3. FOREIGN RELATIONS

In 2010, the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 continued to strain Pakistan's relations with India⁵⁰, with little substantial movement. This despite a meeting between the foreign secretaries of the two countries on 25 February 2010,⁵¹ between the foreign ministers of two countries in Islamabad in July 2010, and between the prime ministers of two countries on the sidelines of the 16th SAARC Conference in Thimpu on April 29, 2010⁵². Furthermore, during March and May meetings of the Indus Permanent Commission, while India shared information with Pakistan on

⁴⁶ Christine Fair, “What Pakistan did right?”, *Foreign Policy (online)*, January 18, 2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/18/what_pakistan_did_right

⁴⁷ For original ToRs, <http://www.pakun.org/flood2010/nodmc.pdf>

⁴⁸ For Oxfam report, click here: [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MUMA-8DK4QM/\\$File/full_report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MUMA-8DK4QM/$File/full_report.pdf)

⁴⁹ News report, Radio Pakistan, <http://www.radio.gov.pk/cms/TopStoryDetail.asp?id=312>

⁵⁰ India conditions talks to the progress being made by Pakistan on effective steps against the militants of November 2008.

⁵¹ Tim Sullivan, "India, Pakistan hold 1st talks since Mumbai attack," February 25, 2010, *The San Deigo Union-Tribune*, <http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/feb/25/india-pakistan-hold-1st-talks-since-mumbai-attack/>

⁵² Special Correspondent, "Manmohan, Gilani meeting today", *The Hindu*, April 28, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article413672.ece>

Uri-II and agreed to open the parapets in the case of Chutak project Pakistan's reservations on Nimoo are still unresolved.⁵³

Closeness between Pakistan and China was further visible throughout 2010. President Asif Zardari made a total of three trips to China⁵⁴, including one six-day tour.⁵⁵ Further, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also made a visit to Pakistan in which a total of 35 agreements and MoU, amounting to US \$25-35 billion of investment over the course of five years, were signed.⁵⁶ While on the one hand, the regular trips of Pakistani President Asif Zardari to China reflects Pakistan's long tilt to China, on the other hand, China's offering of new deals is read as China "coming out of hibernation for not losing Pakistan to USA for good."⁵⁷

The uniformity of domestic players within Pakistan over its relations with China was also evident from the public posture of the political class of Pakistan. In response to the visit of Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao, to Islamabad, nearly all parliamentarians ensured their presence in the country's national legislature, and laudatory remarks were offered by the leader of opposition, Mr. Nisar Ali Khan, in the House.⁵⁸

Among the bilateral and multilateral meetings which Pakistan held with U.S. in 2010, the three rounds of U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue as well as a moot on nuclear terrorism in April occupied a great deal of time and attention. Notwithstanding the level of trust the talks reflected, critics discard the futility of such exercises on the grounds of returning the delegates empty handed. Such criticism, more expressive in the first round of strategic dialogue which was held in March 2010, derived from the changed approach in relations between Pakistan and United States: unlike past, these meetings were meant to be comprehensive and aimed for a long-term view.

Issues like terrorism and Afghanistan-tomorrow were not only discussed in Pakistan's meetings with United States, but were on the agenda in Pakistan's meetings with countries in its region. Besides Afghan President Hamid Karzai's and Turkish President Abdullah Gul's separate visits to Islamabad, Pakistan⁵⁹, Pakistani President Asif Zardari also flew twice to Turkey to attend trilateral summits involving Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey, vowing to address terrorism in the region.⁶⁰ The President was also one of the participants, among the presidents of

⁵³ Gardi Parsai and Sandeep Dikshit, "Pakistan, India can solve water issues with goodwill", *The Hindu*, June 1, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/article443956.ece>

⁵⁴ News report, "Pakistan, China vow to jointly fight terror", *Daily Times*, April 18, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\04\18\story_18-4-2009_pg7_9

⁵⁵ News report, "President Zardari to leave for China today", *The Express Tribune*, July 6, 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/26015/president-zardari-to-leave-for-china-today/>

⁵⁶ News report, "Beijing will 'never give up' Islamabad: Wen", *Daily Times*, December 19, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\12\19\story_19-12-2010_pg1_1

⁵⁷ Attributed to Mr. Imtiaz Gul.

⁵⁸ "Govt, opposition united on Sino-Pak friendship: Nisar," *Geo TV*, December 19, 2010, <http://www.geo.tv/12-19-2010/76039.htm>

⁵⁹ Staff Reporter, "Abdullah Gul arrives on four-day visit", *Daily Times*, March 31, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\03\31\story_31-3-2010_pg7_3

⁶⁰ News report, "Zardari, Karzai, Gul pledge to continue anti-terror cooperation," *Daily Times*, December 25, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\12\25\story_25-12-2010_pg1_4

Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Russia, at the Sochi summit in Russia, where, too, terrorism remained a key item on the agenda.⁶¹

Involvement of regional players, stemming from their interest in the future of Afghanistan and their concern from terrorism, can stifle inter-state rivalries that make into a conflict. However, tradeoff between regional compromise and regional animosity is yet to be seen. As an example, the attack on Indians on guesthouses in Kabul⁶² followed by the killing of four Pakistanis in Afghanistan⁶³ in late February and early March of 2010 and the suspicion against each other clearly expose the presence of rivalry; likewise, in one of the high-profile cases in 2008, India's Kabul embassy was bombed of which Pakistan was being accused of.⁶⁴ Moreover, the response from Saudi Arabia, which was requested by Afghan President Hamid Karzai for mediating with the Taliban, toward the involvement of Iran and Turkey, and even China and Russia is to be seen – the same can be said of others.

1. List Of Selected Foreign Meetings, 2010:

Meeting	Location	Date
Fourth Trilateral Summit among Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan ⁶⁵	Turkey	January 25
Meeting between foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan ⁶⁶	New Delhi, India	February 25
Afghan President's visit to Pakistan	Islamabad, Pakistan	March 10
1 st Ministerial-level U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue ⁶⁷	Washington D.C., USA	March 24-25
Turkish President's visit to Pakistan ⁶⁸	Islamabad, Pakistan	March 30 – April 2
104 th Permanent Indus Commission	Lahore, Pakistan	March 29 – March 31
International conference on nuclear summit ⁶⁹	Washington D.C., USA	April 12 – 13
16 th SAARC Summit ⁷⁰	Thimpu, Bhutan	April 28 – 29
105 th Permanent Indus Commission ⁷¹	New Delhi, India	June 1 – June 3

⁶¹ "Sochi summit for jt strategy on anti-terror, regional security," *Zee News*, August 18, 2010, <http://www.zeenews.com/news649270.html>

⁶² Karin Brulliard, "Afghan intelligence ties Pakistani group Lashkar-i-Taiba to recent Kabul attack," *The Washington Post*, March 3, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/02/AR2010030202427.html>

⁶³ "Five Pakistani road workers shot dead in Afghanistan", *The Times of India*, Mar 4, 2010, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/Five-Pakistani-road-workers-shot-dead-in-Afghanistan/articleshow/5640455.cms#ixzz1CRWbojvh>

⁶⁴ "India blames Pakistan for Kabul embassy attack", *Gulf News*, July 13, 2008, <http://gulfnews.com/news/world/india/india-blames-pakistan-for-kabul-embassy-attack-1.118052>

⁶⁵ <http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/JointStatement.html>

⁶⁶ http://photos.onepakistan.com/main.php?g2_itemId=1646

⁶⁷ http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/sd_march_24_2010_1.html

⁶⁸ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\03\31\story_31-3-2010_pg7_3

⁶⁹ <http://www.state.gov/nuclearsummit/>

⁷⁰ http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/latest_news.php?nid=23446

Bilateral foreign ministers' meeting between Pakistan and India ⁷²	Islamabad, Pakistan	July 14 – 16
President's 6-day tour to China	Beijing, China	July 6
2 nd Ministerial-level U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue ⁷³	Islamabad, Pakistan	July 19
Sochi Summit	Sochi, Russia	August 18
3 rd Ministerial-level U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue ⁷⁴	Washington D.C., USA	October 20 – 22
Chinese Premier visit to Pakistan	Islamabad, Pakistan	December 17 – 19
Fifth Trilateral Summit among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey ⁷⁵	Istanbul, Turkey	December 24
11 th Economic Cooperation Organization Summit ⁷⁶	Istanbul, Turkey	December 22 – 23

4. PROGNOSIS:

Pakistan's tilt toward China and suspended relations with India are a continuation of its old foreign policy paradigm. As of Pakistan's relations with the United States, the gap between objective and desire behind the hand-shakes is clear. While on the one hand, it reflects the level of distrust – something that is further corroborated from the private information that came from leaked diplomatic cables, books, and journalistic sources, on the other hand, it reflects deliberate misinformation as the revelations made by the WikiLeaks documents hardly offer any great mismatch among the domestic players in Pakistan's policy toward U.S.

Despite instances of official distrust, the arrests of terrorists made from Karachi show that there is less coordination on the identification, rather agreement, of threat as compared to the coordination after the identification of threat.

As far as counter-insurgency is concerned, should the “hold” part of the counter-insurgency not succeed, the initial success is wasted. Should that not happen, the people of the area would feel easy with the continuous presence of the troops amidst them. For the parliament to ensure the implementation of the changes made through the 18th amendment, political reforms act must be expanded in the tribal areas and gradual accommodation, if not outright acceptance, must start.

While insurgency and extremism is being dealt with, radicalization is not much paid attention. It means that radicalization, no matter how provocative, is not considered a crime as far as it

⁷¹ <http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article442948.ece>

⁷² <http://netindian.in/news/2010/07/12/0007094/krishna-visit-pakistan-july-14-16-talks-qureshi>

⁷³ <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/144827.htm>

⁷⁴ <http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/uspakstrategicdialogue.html>

⁷⁵ http://www.isria.com/free/21_December_2010_31.php

⁷⁶ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\12\22\story_22-12-2010_pg7_11

doesn't take a toll on the human life. Owing to legal gaps, the convicts get released freely. For the same reason, a bill has been tabled so as to address the discrepancy.

Radicalization in the ex-pat is a dangerous omen. Cut off from their "roots," many ex-pat vie for purity which they find in swinging to the extreme by challenging the culture which invites them. The threat of such radicalization is more noticed in Europe, where Pakistani Diaspora is concentrated in areas – as compared to in U.S. where even the Muslim population is scattered.

Domestically, the dilemma of representative democracy in post-authoritarian state is evident. The single structure, whether religious, ethnic, or sectarian, that was ruling during authoritarian regime faces challenges from the structure which is gaining public attention now – hence, conflicts between the two.

For one, in Karachi, the tensions between Urdu-speakers and Pashtuns halt the economic hub of Pakistan. Karachi is a potential danger because of alignment of several factors, which is religious, ethnic, and sectarian in the city – and their spillover in any nature of conflict.

Two, while the assassination of Salman Taseer at the start of 2011 may not be a slip of Barelvi groups into militant Islamism, the act was certainly inspired by rousing speeches delivered by the clerics, most of who come from the Barelvi sect. It certainly is a clear challenge to Pakistan since majority of the people in Punjab and Sindh subscribe to such a version of Islam.

The religious debate generated on laws and the role of the bodies that measures its Islamic content may remain for long – and is one the most important challenge for 2011. Even the parliamentary committee that proposed 18th amendment didn't go through such bodies, most of which were introduced in 1980s – much like the executive power of the president, which it was able to change. The coalition nature of the present government will also hinder any movement in the direction.

Given the old structure, the desire to have a federation in spirit, as enshrined in the constitution, will keep on facing resistance from the existing structure. This time, it is Punjab which gets hit due to the distribution of resources.

In the longer run, the government will have to look for options to generate revenue as well as distribute resources. Should institutes like CII retain and should the government able to pass NFC awards in time, the larger province of Punjab may feel change in its power position. That by itself will put a pressure for alternative routes –whether a route a home or abroad is to be seen. In the longer run, however, Pakistan will have to balance domestic economic concern and foreign policy objectives by turning the untapped reserves around it for its use.

